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Commentary
Grievance Procedures in the Administrative
Statet
Andrew N. Farley*
PERSPECTIVE

We have witnessed over the past three years and are now witnessing
what some pundits refer to as a "crisis" of confidence in government.
I am not inclined to be that dramatic. This is not to say that the
tensions we are experiencing are not real. The reality of the events
with which we are confronted belies our dream. Regretfully, our intuitive reaction to these tensions is emotional rather than one of
critical analysis and constructive thought. Our basic problem is our way
of life. Meditation, careful analysis and meticulous planning are but
preludes to action. R.G.H. Siu suggests our normative role: "Even
when you don't know what to do, do something."'
The tensions we experience resulted from the confluence of several
significant currents having their source in headwaters at least one, if
not two, generations removed, and affected, without exception, every
significant institution of contemporary society: education, 2 the judici6
0
ary,3 the church, 4 politics, and, certainly, administrative organizations.
t This article generally is based upon the text of Mr. Farley's remarks to the
Northern New England Assembly, at Montpelier, Vermont, on November 19, 1968. The
Assembly was sponsored by the state universities of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont
in conjunction with the American Assembly of Columbia University.
Mr. Farley was a participant in the American Assembly Arden House conference on
"Ombudsmen for American Government?" and, with Mrs. Farley, authored "An American Ombudsman: Due Process in the Administrative State," 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 212 (1964).
* A.B., Washington & Jefferson College; LL.B., Univ. of Pittsburgh School of Law;
M.P.A., Univ. of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and Int'l Affairs. Of the Pennsylvania Bar. Special Partner, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh.
1. R. G. H. Siu, THE TAO OF SCIENCE (1957).
2. See "Columbia in Crisis" 2 PSYCHIATRY & SOCIAL SCIENCE REV., No. 9 (July 1968).
3. Address by Samuel J. Roberts (Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania), The
Bench, the Law and Public Opinion, delivered September 16, 1968, at the Pennsylvania
Conference of State Trial Judges and Pennsylvania Bar Institute. Reprinted in 116
PITTSBURGH L.J. 3 (Nov. 1968).
4. Farley, A Layman's Viewpoint: Crisis in the Church, V Topic: RELIGION IN A
CHANGING WORLD 60 (1965).
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One of these currents has been the evolving irritation of our youth
with some of the values of the Protestant ethic. 7 A second flows from
the sudden realization that the challenge of the technological age
is upon us, seriously affecting our lives, at a time when we are ill-prepared at the administrative level to accept the challenge.8 The third
current of our discontent has been an acute and embarrassing awareness of gross inequity, perpetrated without reason upon members of
our society, white and, predominantly, black."
These tensions, in and of themselves matters crucial in the extreme,
were further inflamed by both the archaic prolificness of administrative organizations and our failure to develop meaningful capabilities
for managing change. 10 The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders emphasizes this point:
The . . . ghetto resident feels deeply that he is not represented

fairly and adequately under the arrangements that prevail in
most cities;"
In the . . . face of the bewildering proliferation of both community demands and local, state and federal programs . . . [there

is a] need to create new mechanisms to aid in decision making,
program planning and coordination; 12 (Brackets supplied.)
...professional representation can provide substantial benefits in
terms of overcoming

. . .

alienation from the institutions [and, I

would add, the processes!] of government .... ;13 (Brackets supplied.)
The lack of communication and the absence of regular contacts
.... prevents community leaders from learning about problems
and grievances. .... 14
5. Paper by Adam Walinsky, FOUR ILLUSIONS, presented October 5, 1968, at the
organizational meeting of the New Democratic Coalition.
6. E.g. L. RAINWATER and W. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF
CONTROVERSY (1967); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, "Behavioral Sciences and the National
Security," 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
7. Halleck, Why They'd Rather Do Their Own Thing, 34 THINK No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.,
1968).
8. Farley, The Challenge of Urban Planning, 13-14 INT'L REV. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (N.S.) 211 (Rome: CEPAS, 1965).
9.

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968) [herein-

0. ORNATI, POVERTY AMID AFFLUENCE (1966); N.
(1962).

after the Report];
OTHER AMERICA

HARRINGTON,

THE

10. See Paper by William W. Herrman, Riot Prevention and Control: Operations
Research and Response, presented April 8, 1968, at the Second Nat'l Symposium on Law
Enforcement Science and Technology (SP-3116).
11.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 296.
12. Id. at 293.
13. Id.

14.

Id. at 285.
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The same points are equally applicable to members of the middle
economic class who are
• . . subect to many of the same frustrations and resentments in
dealing with the public bureaucracy as ghetto residents, [but] find
it relatively easy to locate the appropriate agency, for help and
redress. If they fail to get satisfaction, they can call on a variety of
remedies--assistance of elected representatives, friends in government, a lawyer .... 15 (Emphasis and brackets supplied.)
Viewed from a slightly different vantage point, a hallmark of this
quarter of a century has been the unparalleled extension of government services yielding a steady proliferation of administrative agencies.
While this concern with extending government responsibilities in the
provision of social services and the management of the economy seems
most pervasive at the federal level, in fact, agency growth has
occurred with g-reater frequency within the jurisdictions of state and
local governments. For example, in the five year interval between the
1961 and 1967 Census of Governments, the number of governmen tal
units increased by thirteen in Maine, by five in New Hampshire, and
by fifteen in Vermont. Furthermore, each of the New England states,
contrary to the national experience, increased the number of its
autonomous school districts. 16 By comparison, the number of local
15. Id. The Commission specifically noted that
• . . the typical ghetto resident has complicated social and economic problems which
often require the services of a whole variety of government and private agencies.
At the same time, he may be unable to break down his problems in ways which
fit the complicated structure of government. Moreover, he is often unaware of his
rights and opportunities . . . and unable to develop the necessary guidance from
either public or private sources.
Max Ways, writing in FORTUNE, describes the fragmentation of one citizen's contacts with
that nebulous entity, "government." The young Negro, half-literate product of a rural
southern school, found through bitter experience that each fragment of the governmental apparatus assumed it knew better than Jeff did about the corresponding fragment
of his life. The school system was concerned with one factor; the health services with
another; the police with a third; and the social worker, yet another. No one was concerned with Jeff as a whole man. Author Ways concluded that:. . . there was nothing in the structure of the city to which the whole Jeff could
attach himself, no point at which he could experience the reciprocal awareness,
the mutual trust, of citizen and city . . . [a]sk Negroes what and whom they hate
most. High on their hate list are social workers, teachers, hospital staff-all the
people who have been trying to help this fragment and that fragment of a Negro's
life. This attitude is, of course, unfair . . . the Negro hates them because they are
his points of contact with a system that insists that he travel all the way to meet
its terms, a system that has lost its unity, its heart, that will not reach out with
warmth toward where he is ....
The Deeper Shame of the Cities, FORTUNE 132, 206
(Jan. 1968).
16. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1967
(88th ed.), at 416, and 1961 (82d ed.), at 401. The increase in autonomous school districts
in the three northern New England states was from 8 to 26 in Maine, 220 to 221 in
New Hampshire, and 16 to 32 in Vermont.
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government units in Pennsylvania, by taxing power and type, increased by over one thousand units (from 5073 to 6201) in the same
period. 17 These figures are conservative, excluding all semi-autonomous
agencies through which these states and their local governments provide for certain functions, i.e. "dependent" school systems; state-supported and state-related institutions of higher education; and the
quasi-public authorities and special agencies or districts.
Without doubt, this growth was fostered by need as perceived by
changing "communities of interest." The basic question-as yet unresolved-is whether in the attempt to administer to felt need, local
governmental units are effective units for administration and execution. Certainly the early emphasis on and continuing support of federal programs resulted primarily from our unfortunate experience
with the capability, and at times the unwillingness, of state and local
government to effectively and efficiently meet such needs. Mal-apportionment of state legislatures, antiquated state constitutions, low
compensation for elected and appointed officers, and interim, sporadic
convocation of the legislative branch constituted the major impediments
to effective and responsive government at state levels. 18 Too, historical
stress upon decentralized local government resulted in an inhibition
of regional cooperation for meaningful problem-solving; duplication
in essential services, including administration; fragmentation of formal
lines of authority; and the propensity to establish innovative institutions to avoid the foregoing practical restrictions.' Today the same
obstacles to effective and responsive state and local government remain. It cannot be challenged that this topsy growth has engendered
incongruities, vagaries, trivialities, and rivalries in the administration
of individual and communal services.
The peril is obvious: the opportunities to be realized in the resolution of tensions is endangered to the extent the citizenry reacts blindly,
17.
18.

Id.
Flynn, The Crisis of Federalism: Who Is Responsible?, 51 A.B.A.J. 229 (1965).

19. Farley, supra note 8. The restrictions upon local government operations -were
originally intended to insure that local governmental units would remain responsive
to the persons within their geographic jurisdictions. However, popular needs required
the performance of functions which a single local governmental unit could not undertake-either because of stringent indebtedness restrictions or the necessity for breaching
jurisdictional boundaries. To meet the need, the concept of the "authority" was increasingly used. The end result is that, in most instances, debt service paid by this
entity (rather than by the state or some other body with the power to tax) is more
expensive and its governing board less responsive to the demands of the body politic.
See Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Bell in Basehore v. Hampden Industrial
Development Authority, 433 Pa. 40, 63 (1969).
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emotionally-out of intense and continuing frustration-to
pervasive accoutrements of bureaucracy.
GRIEVANCE

these

PROCESSING

Our orientation in the face of these tensions must be a re-emphasis
of human values. Achieving this emphasis is dependent upon the provision of recourse by the individual citizen from an administrative
judgment of the bureaucracy. The need for such a solution arises out
of two increasingly commonplace complaints. In the first, the citizen
inveighs against discretionary decisions because he disagrees with the
manner in which an official has exercised his discretion. The second
complaint stems from the citizen's allegation of official misconduct and
arbitrary abuse of power. In neither case does the citizen have recourse
to a convenient forum in which he might air his grievance or challenge
the discretionary act.
How, then, are these grievances to be promptly heard? Consider
present-existing procedures by which grievances are heard in the administrative state. To do so, we must have some criteria against which
the extant procedures can be judged. With slight modification Professor Gwyn's "desirable consequences of the Ombudsman's activities" 20
provide an acceptable functional measurement. Grievance procedures
should:
-Provide the individual with a means of redress which is prompt,
responsive and inexpensive.
-Provide
societal protection against maladministration in gross.
--4Reduce (and, hopefully, reverse) the trend toward citizen alienation with the administrative state, with the net goal of enhancing the public's confidence in the administration of its
affairs.
-Promote legislative oversight, reducing the time-consuming function of case work to permit more critical consideration of legis21
lation.
20. Gwyn, Transferring the Ombudsman, OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? 37,
40-43 (The American Assembly, 1968).
21. It is clear beyond doubt that with the possible exception of California and New
York, state legislators are without staff and facilities adequate to undertake case work.
Even at the federal level, my associate, Congressman William Steiger (R.-Wisc.), conceding that constituent case work is an "ombudsmanic" function, acknowledges that the
number of inquiries is fast consuming too much time, not only of the elected representative, but also of his staff, leaving too little time for the performance of the Congressman's
principal function-legislation.
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-Protect
the civil servant from
22
calumny.

unfounded criticism and public

Many devices, governmental and private, formal and informal,
serve to promote access of the individual to the administrative agency
in situations where he believes he has been aggrieved. For example,
there are internal avenues of appeal within the administrative agency
itself, and external avenues through judicial institutions.
The former may involve two distinct concepts. In the first case the
agency formalizes its "grievance hearing" function by establishing its
own investigative unit. Ready examples are the inspectors general of
the military services and the investigatory division of the Maine State
Police. A second concept involved in such internal appeals is that
brought to mind by the phrase "up the chain of command" and usually
acknowledged by the external agency, the judiciary, by the jurisdictional requirement that, normally, all remedies before the agency
must have been invoked or exhausted before the court will hear the
case.
As to either alternative of internal redress, one generalization is
pertinent: with the sole exception of New York,2 3 historically less
attention has been given to the functioning of state administrative
agencies, including their procedural and substantive rules, than has
been devoted to the study and improvement of the federal bureaucracy.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, adopted in one form
or another in some twenty-five jurisdictions (excluding Pennsylvania 24),
and the occasional studies which mark the long-delayed progress of
22. See Address by Andrew N. Farley, The Ombudsman, delivered to the Pittsburgh
Chapter of the Federal Bar Association, January 12, 1968:
I do not propose the institution of the ombudsman at any level of government as a
penalty or yoke upon the administrator. There are few people who have worked
closely with persons in responsible positions at all levels of government who do not
appreciate that those who labor in the public's service, for the most part, give as
much attention to the needs and concerns of the individual as to the broader
societal and national goals. But we have all felt the constraints of rules and regulations which failed adequately to discriminate, and likewise know persons who fail
to appreciate or acknowledge the humanity of the individuals whom we serve. Even
more crucial-we have felt inadequate and helpless in attempting to reverse these
pressures. 116 PITrSBURGH L.J. (Oct. 1968).
23. R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942).
24. A detailed comparison between the Model Act and the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388 as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§§1710.1 et seq. (1962), was beyond the scope of the author's address to the Northern
New England Assembly. It is, however, difficult to understand why the Pennsylvania
General Assembly has failed adequately to consider adoption of either the Model Act
of 1946 or the Revised Act of 1961. For the student, a good starting point in comparison
of the Model Act and the Pennsylvania statute is the reference Table of Statutes in
F. COOPER, II STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 903ff. (American Bar Foundation, 1965).
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this limited review of state administrative agency operations, emphasize this limitation. Indeed, the announced goal of the drafters of
the Model Act was:
• . . to encourage [state administrative] agencies to give reasoned
explanations of their own decisions, to specify clearly avenues of
appeal. 25 (Brackets added.)
The internal agency review, either through a special department or
senior administrators, does not seem best calculated to insure against
maladministration, to guard against citizen alienation and distrust,
to promote legislative oversight, or to protect the civil servant from
unfounded criticism. At this echelon of government one is more likely
to find the civil servant inclined to protect the reputation of his
agency or department.
The option of internal agency review, particularly at the local and
state levels of government, is less viable. At this level of government
the citizen too frequently encounters a greater proportion of political
appointees whose judgment and exercise of discretion respond to influences extraneous to the merits per se of the issues at hand. A further
disability of effective grievance processing at this level of government
is the relatively smaller size of staff. This invites an avoidance of
confrontations with influential representative clientele and promotes
the tendency to gloss over individual cases in an effort to keep abreast
26
of the case load.

With few exceptions, the regulatory and administrative agencies
of the several states, including Pennsylvania, seldom maintain uniform
25. Id. at 24. The major principles embraced in the Act as adopted by the Conference are:
(1) Requirement that each agency shall adopt essential procedural rules, and, except
in emergencies, that all rule making, both procedural and substantive, shall be accompanied by notice to interested persons, and opportunity to submit views or
information;
(2) Assurance of proper publicity for all administrative rules;
(3) Provision for advance determination of the validity of administrative rules, and
for "declaratory rulings," affording advance determination of the applicability of
administrative rules to particular cases;
(4) Assurance of fundamental fairness in administrative adjudicative hearings, particularly in regard to such matters as notice, rules of evidence, the taking of official
notice, the exclusion of factual material not properly presented and made a part of
the record, the proper separation of functions;
(5) Assurance of personal familiarity with the evidence on the part of the responsible
deciding officers and agency heads in quasi-judicial cases;
(6) Provision for proper proceedings for and scope of judicial review of administrative orders, thus assuring correction of administrative errors. F. COOPER, II STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 801-02 (American Bar Foundation, 1965).
26. Id. at 3-5.
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rules of procedure, and the substantive guidelines are most frequently
wrought in the crucible of litigation-from the agency to the trial
de novo to appellate review.
Tested against our criteria, external procedures, e.g. judicial review,
frequently are an unacceptable means of securing redress of grievances
by the individual citizen. Assuming jurisdiction and the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, courts, in frequent instances, consider themselves bound by the expertise of the administrative agency as to all
questions of fact. In addition, and notwithstanding public disclaimers
to the contrary, there is little reason to believe that state courts in major
metropolitan counties are current and, therefore, that redress will be
"prompt." Nor is recourse to a judicial determination inexpensive.
Because justiciable issues are heard on a case by case basis-and
theoretically a decision in one case is not binding upon a different
party although the facts are identical-litigation frequently fails to
protect society against maladministration in gross. Neither does the
delimited function of a court-at least in the adversary system of justice
-permit the court effectively to counter citizen alienation, promote
legislative review of significant concerns or recommend corrective
legislation, let alone promote the esprit of the civil servant. And
finally, in comparison with the federal tribunals, politics per se plays
a much more important and, regretfully, successful role in the functions
of the state judiciary-especially at the justice of the peace or magisterial and trial levels.
Legal aid has often been favorably compared to the ombudsman
concept when discussing recourse of an individual from a judgment
of the bureaucracy, but the difference is greater than the similarity.
The legal aid institutions-public and private and including the
neighborhood legal services agency-are often restricted in their
clientele, by law, by resolution of the agencies' board of directors,
or by agreement with the local bar association (whose intention is
protection of the individual practitioner within its jurisdiction). To
the extent that such agencies must turn to the courts when seeking
redress for their clients, my comments earlier respecting the crucial
inability of the judiciary to respond in conformance with our criteria
for measurement are equally applicable. It must be admitted in favor
of this concept, however, that the executive of a legal aid organization
has a unique opportunity to generalize his agency's experience, and by
so doing can provide a modicum of societal protection against official
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misconduct and abuse of discretion, as well as propose and actively
support corrective legislation.
An individual may choose to seek redress by referring his grievance
to his legislator. But, at the state level, the individual legislator has
neither staff, research assistance, time, nor inclination to act as an
ombudsman-even if one assumes this is properly a legislator's responsibility! Here too, the conceptual framework of government has
broken down. In almost every one of the fifty jurisdictions, the legislative branch endures a part-time existence, with acutely limited interim resources, and depends upon the executive department and upon
organized special interest groups in the performance of two historic
legislative responsibilities: (a) the proposal of new legislation and (b)
27
the continuing surveillance of governmental operations.
In the more flagrant situation, the news media or private organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, may promote an
individual's cause in the interest of "justice." Such methods are sporadic at best-and more often than not only the "high visibility"
causes are stressed.
I find the above grievance processing procedures wanting. However,
notwithstanding their limitations, the existence of a variety of means
of access for the redress of citizen grievances is salutary. The means
just discussed are useful, and should be improved, but must be supplemented.
THE OMBUDSMAN

The American approaches, interests and objectives with respect to
resolving citizen grievances-at both federal and state levels-differ
markedly from those embodied in the Scandinavian ombudsman concept. The mutual intention is toward more uniform, responsive, and
democratically oriented administrative practices and procedures. The

emphasis in the United States and the several states, however, has been
upon internal executive control and legislative (and politically oriented)
investigations of the bureaucracy, subject always to severely restricted
jurisdictional parametres, rather than upon responsiveness to direct,
individualized, citizen complaint. Notwithstanding our intention, however admirable, the fact unfortunately remains that in actual practice
the established processes for resolution of grievances at the local and
27. Cf. G. GALLOWAY, HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 185, 188 (1961)
to the "legislative oversight" functions performed by the United States Congress.
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state government levels is either non-existent or, what is more tragic,
28
inaccessible to the person who most needs the guidance and the service.
This situation-the convergence of maximum contact (and, thus,
enhanced opportunity for the wrongful or foolish exercise of administrative discretion) with minimum internal or external and objective
safeguards (and, consequently, a paucity of effective recourse by the aggrieved citizen)-seems ripe for the introduction of a modified version
of the ombudsman. 29
Approximately three years ago, the question of the desirability of
the institution in Pennsylvania of the concept of the ombudsman was
considered. 30 In evaluating the ramifications of adaption of this institution, it became apparent that at the state level it was preferable to have
28. The Institute for Local Self-Government, Berkeley, California, began pilot research on local government procedures for dealing with citizen grievances. The Institute's
results indicate ". . . a potentially serious weakness in local government caused by a
general absence of accessible and inexpensive procedures for objecting to decisions or
non-decisions." See: Preliminary Inventory of Selected Administrative Procedures for the
Redress of Citizen Grievances in California's Urban Areas (Sept. 1966), and The Mexican
Amparo as a Supplemental Remedy for the Redress of Citizen Grievances in California
(Jan. 1967).
29. The Northern New England Assembly in Plenary Session at Montpelier, Vermont,
November 20, 1968, concluded that
• . . [the] creation of state Ombudsmen for Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont
would be helpful to both the citizens and the government of those states.
Ombudsman legislation had previously been introduced in these three states and in
the remaining 47 state jurisdictions. SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OMBUDSMEN-1967: COMPILATION OF STATE PROPOSALS (1967). Only Hawaii has enacted ombudsmanic legislation,
the text of which is set forth in the Appendix at 368ff. in ROWAT, infra note 31.
There is presently pending in the Pennsylvania General Assembly legislation to
establish
• . . an office of Grievance Commissioner with the authority to investigate, either
on a complaint by a citizen or on his own motion, decisions, acts and other matters
of agencies of the Comonwealth . . .. so as to promote higher standards of competence, efficiency and justice in the administration of State laws. . . House Bill
530 (Printer's No. 613), Sess. of 1969 [hereinafter the Bill].
This legislation, previously introduced in the 1967 and 1968 Sessions of the General
Assembly, but never reported out of Committee, sparked an immediate and generally
unfavorable reaction from the Executive Offices. The Pittsburgh Press, Mar. 30, 1969, at
9, col. 1. The point argued was that the Governor's "branch offices" throughqut the
State ". . . are equipped to do anything that an ombudsman would be able to do." Id.
While it is no doubt true these offices, and particularly those in ghetto areas, have
served the citizen well, I doubt that such offices are empowered ". . . to investigate any
decision, recommendation, or any act done or omitted relating to a matter of adto compel the attendance and testimony, by
", Bill § 11(a), or "...
ministration ..
subpoena and capias, and [to] examine on oath any person . . . who is able to give any
such information.

. . .", Bill § 15(b), as is required by an ombudsman to complete a

matter under investigation, or to report annually to the Governor and the General
Assembly, Bill § 16. (Emphasis and brackets added).
30. Privately circulated Memorandum, Ombudsman for Pennsylvania, August 10,
1966, with accompanying legislative proposal. This study was undertaken by the author and
his wife, Marta P. Farley, at the request of the honorable Genevieve Blatt, then Secretary of Internal Affairs, an elective constitutional office since abolished and, to Miss
Blatt's credit, largely upon her insistence.
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the ombudsman as an executive officer rather than an agent of the
General Assembly. 31 This procedure seems mandatory, given the fact
that legislatures in Pennsylvania and in other states have been losing
ground to the initiative of the executive and the innovation of the
bureaucracy. As the concept of the ombudsman aims at preventing
abuse in the administrative sphere without impeding either independence or efficiency, opting for an ombudsman as an officer within the
executive department but independent of the Governor would enhance
his effectiveness. Ineffectiveness and even failure are not remote possibilities if the raison d'etre for the institution is to be as a makeweight
in the system of separation of powers. In fact, one of the earliest proposals in the United States analogous to the ombudsman conceived of
an executive officer empowered to receive public complaints and
grievances and to tender suggestions regarding procedures deemed
32
objectionable or requiring improvement.
Similarly, the most well-known institution charged with administrative oversight, the French Conseil d'Etat, is an agency of the executive
department, exercising quasi-judicial functions [e.g. cassation and recours de pleine juridiction]. The Conseil is primarily charged, however, with "general and exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over administrative decisions . . .[and is] a general adviser of the Government
on administrative matters and of the drafts of legislation submitted by
Government Departments. ' 33 One of the unique parallels to the Conseil
is the ombudsman: he is a judicial officer in the sense that he is
expected to make public his evidence and the rationale for his decisions;
he is an executive officer and administrative agent inasmuch as his
primary concern is with the enforcement of existing laws. The om31. Cf. D. ROWAT, ED., THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER (2d ed., 1968):It is becoming all too easy to lose sight of the three essential features of the original
Ombudsman systems.
These are:

(1) The Ombudsman is an independent and non-partisan officer of the legislature,
usually provided for in the constitution, who supervises the administration;
(2) He deals with specific complaints from the public against administrative injustice and maladministration; and
(3) He has the power to investigate, criticize and publicize, but not to reverse, administrative action. Id. at xxiv.
But see Gwyn, supra note 20, at 46:-"Must we then conclude that any Ombudsman
who is not selected by the legislature is a faculty specimen? Our analysis of the structure and consequences of the Ombudsman suggests that we need not."
32. Benjamin, supra note 23, at 18.
33.

H.

LUETHY, FRANCE AGAINST HERSELF

19-20 (1957);

SIR JOHN WHYATT, ED., THE

CITIZER AND THE ADMINISTRATION §§ 13-14 (1961); Memorandum from Howard Richards,
Adaptation of the Ombudsman Idea to the United States, privately circulated to the Staff
of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, March 16, 1965.
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budsman, however, has a third functional attribute which the Conseil
does not: He is a legislative officer to the extent his experiences suggest the need for refinements or revisions in existing laws and to the
extent he accepts, evaluates, and acts upon complaints referred to
him by individuals, whether directly or through their legislators.
Several other factors are persuasive in the case for making the ombudsman an executive officer. Gubernatorial appointment, without
major exception, has been the traditional method for naming state
officials. Legislative appointment has been relatively rare, being limited
in Pennsylvania to the naming of members of the governing boards
of state-related educational institutions. Also, the Governor, elected
at large, is somewhat more immune to varying political pressures, a
a tendency that would enable the ombudsman to avoid becoming
involved in the controversy which necessarily accompanies the process
of compromise in predominantly two-party legislatures. Furthermore,
a qualified candidate could be persuaded to undertake the responsibilities of ombudsman by a Governor who could virtually assure
his appointment. Finally, the Governor, entrusted with the obligation
of nominating the ombudsman, would be aware that his personal and
official prestige would be inextricably interwoven with the qualifications and, ultimately, the performance of his nominee in the conduct
of the ombudsman's duties. Contrariwise, the most serious failure in
legislative appointment is the inability to fix with certitude ultimate
responsibility for the appointment.3 4
The ombudsman's independence from the executive would be enhanced by requiring the consent of the legislature to the appointment.
Once appointed, the ombudsman's continued independence would be
promoted by establishing his term of office as slightly longer than
that of the Governor's and permitting the ombudsman to succeed
himself in office for a number of terms, subject only to removal for
34. The Bill, supra note 29, provides for creation of an Appointment Board consisting of
. . . the President of the Pennsylvania State University, the Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh, the President of Temple University, the President of the
Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce, the President of the Pennsylvania AFLCIO, and the President of the Pennsylvania League of Women Voters, all ex-ofllcio,
and three additional members; one to be appointed by the Governor, one to be
appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the State Senate and one to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Bill, § 3(b).
Of the one or more candidates nominated by the Appointment Board, the Governor
selects one as the Grievance Commissioner. There is no provision for the advice and
consent of the General Assembly.
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defined causes by action of two-thirds of both houses of the legislative
35
branch.
Obviously any proposal for establishing the ombudsman at the level
of State government with broad supervisory powers at the local or
municipal echelons must consider the comparability of environment,
one facet of which is publicity. In a civilized community public opinion
is a powerful means to secure the proper functioning of government
administration and to afford the possibility of remedy to an aggrieved
citizen. Thus there should be a requirement that the ombudsman's
annual report be released simultaneously to the Governor, the legislative branch, and the public media.
In all countries where the ombudsman is extant, a characteristic
feature of the office is its lack of bureaucratic image. The ombudsman
-even following the appointment of a deputy ombudsman in Sweden
-is a highly personal institution. Proponents as well as critics of
transferability claim this factor constitutes one of the major axioms
of success. All of the state proposals reviewed to date conceive of
limited staffs and rely heavily upon the personal factor. 36
By our earlier established scale of values, one of the criteria important to redress of grievances is popular identification with the
personal efforts and being of the officer in charge. These characteristics
are easily maintained, as the Swedish experience amply demonstrates,
even when deputies are named. Thus, in Pennsylvania, it was suggested that the ombudsman's office be established on a geographic
basis, with the ombudsman situated at the capital (Harrisburg) and
his two deputies at either end of the state, one in the east (at Philadelphia) and one in the west (at Pittsburgh).37
This organization of the office would also permit realization of a
second goal-supervision of the administrative sphere at the local gov35. The Bill, supra note 29, establishes the Grievance Commissioner's term of office
as six years and he may be removed from office ". . . for neglect of duty, misconduct,
or disability upon the recommendation of the Governor and upon a two-thirds vote
of each house of the General Assembly in affirmance thereof." Bill, § 5.
36. The Grievance Commissioner ". . . shall be learned in the processes of law and
government and have a distinguished intellectual standing in his profession .. ." Bill,
§ 4(1). In addition the Grievance Commissioner shall not have been a member of the
State legislature for two years prior to his appointment and shall not ". . . hold any
office for reward or profit under the State during his tenure or for two years thereafter." Bill, § 4(3).
37. The pending Pennsylvania legislation authorizes appointment, by the ombudsman,
of a first assistant and ". . . such other oficers and employees as may be necessary for
the efficient performance of his functions." (Emphasis added). Bill, § 8(a). Geographic
dispersion thus remains a possibility.
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ernment level. 8 Geographic distribution enhances access by the public
and, while opinions and recommendations would issue only from the
ombudsman himself, the continuation of deputies in defined locations
would facilitate the development of a familiarity with and expertise in
the organization and patterns of administration within the area assigned.
CONCLUSION

The advantages to be gained from the institution of Ombudsman
benefit the government's administrator and the citizen:*

*

*

*

*

*

The Ombudsman provides an effective means for examining alleged maladministration.
The governmental administration benefits from the recommendations of the Ombudsman based upon his over-all view of the system and his specialized experience.
Assemblymen are assured that their constituent's complaint is
handled on a professional and impartial basis, but with personal
concern and attention to detail not presently possible.
Complaints are examined on their merits and not on the basis of
the amount of pressure which can be brought to bear by the complainant.
The experiences of the Ombudsman would permit him to make
incisive recommendations for clarification, amendment, or initiation of administrative rules and regulations as well as of legislation.
The Ombudsman provides continuity and informal procedures
for dealing with administrative malfunctions at minimum cost to
the government and at no direct cost to the citizen.

Indeed, considering the homogeneity of the population of the several states; the vital public concern for more democratic and responsive government; as well as the identity of social and political environment, one would suggest that we now face the best opportunity for
transferring the concept of the ombudsman successfully.
38. Unfortunately, excluded from the purview of the Pennsylvania Grievance Commissioner is "any political subdivision of the State or entity thereof." Bill, § 2(5).
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